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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
This case involves the proper interpretation and construction
of a contract, namely the Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing
and

related Note

reproduced

in the Addendum

respectively.

1

at tabs A and D

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant

to

Rule

24(c)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, Appellants Mark and Geneve Cromar reply herein only to
those new matters raised by Appellee Donald Dwyer not otherwise
covered in their principal brief.

ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO RAISE
ARGUMENTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

A.

Promissory Note.

Cromars

agree

that

appellate

courts

generally

will

not

consider arguments relating to matters not raised in the pleadings
nor put in issue at trial and which are presented for the first
time on appeal.

See, e.g., Smith v. Iversen, 848 P. 2d 677 (Utah

1993); Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d
651, 657 (Utah 1988); Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754,
758 (Utah 1984); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493,
494 (Utah 1983); Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,
1359 (Utah App. 1991); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah
App. 1987).

This clearly is not such a case.

Dwyer contends that the Cromars are attempting to raise a new
issue on appeal, namely that "The Cromars never contended in the
court below that Dwyer had a duty to pay attorney's fees directly
2

to them under the terms of the note." (Brief of Appellee at 5.)
Dwyer's characterization
which

of Cromars' argument misses the point

is that Dwyer assumed the Note and agreed to

Cromars

for

"any

and

all"

obligations

arising

indemnify

thereunder.

(Agreement at 2d.) (Add. D.)
The argument raised by the Cromars below and on appeal is that
Dwyer's promise as expressly set forth in the Agreement Surviving
Real Estate Closing was to hold them harmless, including reasonable
attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained in the
Second Trust Deed and Note dated November 6, 1979. (Agreement, Add.
D.)

Thus, the underlying obligation referred to in the Agreement

which forms the basis of this action was the Cromars' duty to pay
Chaffins'

principal,

interest,

and

costs

including

reasonable

attorney's fees if suit were brought on the Note, which obligation
was assumed by Dwyer. (R. 29, 57.)

Once judgment was entered in

favor of Chaffins and against Cromars on the Note, Dwyer

incurred

the primary obligation to indemnify Cromars for their loss pursuant
to the express terms of the Agreement, which incorporated the terms
of the Note by reference. (Agreement at 2d.) (Add. D.)
Cromars basic argument was raised in the pleadings stage of
this action against Dwyer as follows:
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Dwyer assumed the
Note and held the Cromars harmless from any and all
obligations
under
the Note, including
reasonable
attorneys fees.

Third Party Complaint at para, 10- (R. 29)

3

Dwyer admitted this allegation in the Second Defense of his
Answer (R. 57) and despite subsequent denials (R. 235), the court
so found. (R. 261.)
The

argument

was

specifically

presented

to

the

court

in

Cromars' Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted except for
an award of attorney's fees. (R. 155; 158-62; 253-55).
Dwyer's contention that Cromars are raising a new argument in
this regard misconstrues their position and lacks merit.
B.

Attorney's Fees.

In the court below, the trial judge initially awarded the
Cromars

"such attorney's

fees and

costs

against

Dwyer

supported by affidavit and as are awarded by the court."
62; Add. F.)

as are
(R. 260-

The Cromars then submitted an Affidavit of Attorneys'

Fees and Costs which contained a description of time spent both in
the defense of the action by Chaffins and the prosecution of the
summary judgment motion against Dwyer. (R. 303-07; Add. F.)

The

precise wording is as follows:
(b) Attorneys' fees:
(Factual
investigation;
preparation
of
documents, affidavits, pleadings, research and
correspondence with respect to the defense of
the action for summary judgment by Chaffins
and the prosecution of the motion for summary
judgment against Dwyer, including preparation
of judgment and conferences with client and
opposing counsel regarding the same).
73.5 Total Hours
TOTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES:

$7,259.75

Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Add. F.) (Emphasis added.)

4

It is obvious from the text of the Affidavit quoted above that
Cromars claimed attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the
action against Chaffins in the court below.
hardly a new issue.
incurred

in

This is, therefore,

Dwyer, however, only objected to those fees

enforcing

the

Agreement.

(R.

267-70;

294-99.)

Cromars' arguments below were consequently designed to overcome
this specific objection.

(R. 286-91.)

At no time did the Cromars waive their right to

recover

attorney's fees incurred in defending the action which were claimed
from the outset. On the contrary, they have always maintained that
they are entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred both for
defense

and

enforcement

purposes.

Dwyer's

contention

to

the

contrary lacks merit on this point as well.
II.
THE RULE THAT A CONTRACT WILL BE CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE DRAFTER ONLY APPLIES IN CASES
WHERE OTHER FACTORS ARE NOT DECISIVE.
Dwyer argues that since the Agreement was drafted by the
Cromars' agent, i.e., Paramount Title Corporation, any ambiguity
therein must be construed in his favor.

(Brief of Appellee at 7.)

In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the
Agreement was prepared by the Cromars or their agent.

The Cromars

did not select the terms of the contract or had any reason to know
of uncertainties
construction

does

in

its meaning.

not

apply.

Conseguently,
See,

Contracts § 206 (1981). (Add. L.)
5

Restatement

this

rule of

(Second)

of

In

this

case,

Cromars

have

demonstrated

that

the

more

reasonable interpretation of the Agreement favors the creation of
an obligation to pay attorney's fees in addition to those covered
by the Note, including enforcement of the Agreement itself.

They

have cited other factors such as the decisions of other courts
interpreting similarly broad

language to permit such recovery.

Finally, they have advanced public policy reasons favoring the
award.

In short, this is not a case in which resort must be made

to a rule of construction in order to break a tie between two
reasonable meanings as contemplated by the rule.

Id.

CONCLUSION
The issues raised on this appeal were presented below and
ruled upon by the trial court. Dwyer has failed to demonstrate why
the Cromars should not be entitled to an award of attorney's fees
in this case.

The Summary Judgment of the lower court should be

reversed insofar as it denies the Cromars' attorney's fees and the
case remanded for a determination and award of such fees as are
just.

6
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day of December, 1993.
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ADDENDUM L

Ch. 9

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

§ 206

§ 2 0 6 . Interpretation Against the Draftsman
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning
is generally preferred which operates against the
party who supplies the words or from whom a writing
otherwise proceeds.
Comment:
a. Rationale. Where one party chooses the terms of a contract,
he is likely to provide more carefully for the protection of his own
interests than for those of the other party. He is also more likely than
the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning.
Indeed, he may leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt, therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive, there is substantial reason for preferring the meaning of the other party. The rule is often
invoked in cases of standardized contracts and in cases where the
drafting party has the stronger bargaining position, but it is not limited to such cases. It is in strictness a rule of legal effect, sometimes
called construction, as well as interpretation: its operation depends on
the positions of the parties as they appear in litigation, and sometimes
the result is hard to distinguish from a denial of effect to an unconscionable clause.
b. Compulsory contract or term. The rule that language is interpreted against the party who chose it has no direct application to
cases where the language is prescribed by law, as is sometimes true
with respect to insurance policies, bills of lading and other standardized documents. In some cases, however, the statute or regulation
adopts language which was previously used without compulsion and
was interpreted against the drafting party, and there is normally no
intention to change the established meaning. Moreover, insurers are
more likely than insureds to participate in drafting prescribed forms
and to review them carefully before putting them into use.
REPORTER'S NOTE
This Section carries forward the 07 (2d Cir. 1970), quoting from this
substance of former § 236(d). See 3 Comment in Tentative Draft; GodCorbin, Contracts § 559 (1960 & dard v. South Bay Union High School
Supp. 1980); 4 Williston, Contracts § Dist., 79 Cal. App.3d 98, 144 Cal.
621 (3d ed. 1961).
Rptr. 701 (1978); Pappas v. Bever,
Comment a. On the general rule, 219 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1974). That it
see, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. has less force when the other party
Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197,1206- has taken an active role in the draftS«+ Appendix for Court Citation* and Cross R«f«r«nc*s

105

§ 206

CONTRACTS, SECOND

Ch. 9

ing process, or is particularly knowl- CI. 310, 427 F.2d 722 (1970). Noneedgeable, see Centennial Ent., Inc. theless, one may doubt that the rule
v. Mansfield Dev. Co., 568 P.2d 50 is "the last one to be resorted to, and
(Colo. 1977); Crestview Bowl, Inc. v. never to be applied except when
Womer Constr. Co., 225 Kan. 335, other rules of interpretation fail,"
592P.2d74(1979);Grazianov.Tortora Quad Constr., Inc. v. Wm. A. Smith
Agency, Inc., 78 Misc.2d 1094, 359 Contr. Co., 534 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir.
N.Y.S.2d 489 (Civ. Ct. 1974). As the 1976), quoting (in a diversity case)
text of the Section makes clear, the from Patterson v. Gage, 11 Colo. 50,
rule does not apply if the non-drafting 16 P. 560 (1888).
party's interpretation is unreasonaComment b. The substance of this
ble. See Intertherm, Inc. v. Coronet C o m m e n t w a s con tained in former §
Imp. Corp., 558 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct. 236(d) as a qualification of the general
App. 1977), quoting fromthis Com- r u l e c o n c e r n ing terms prescribed by
ment in Tentative Draft; Perry and j a w
Wallis, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct.
§ 207.

Interpretation Favoring the Public

In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning
that serves the public interest is generally preferred.
Comment:
a. Scope. The rule preferring an interpretation which favors an
interest of the public applies only to agreements which affect a public
interest. It is a rule of legal effect as well as interpretation, and rests
more on considerations of public policy than on the probable intention
of the parties. It has often been relied on to justify narrow construction of a grant of a public franchise or an agreement for a tax exemption. In general, it does not prefer the interest of a governmental
agency as a party to a contract; government contracts are likely to be
construed against the government as the drafting party.
Illustration:
1. A is employed by B as an inventor. In an agreement
settling their disputes on termination of the employment, A promises to assign to B all A's rights in amending patent application
and all improvements on the invention covered. Thereafter A
makes an invention and applies for a patent, and B claims it as an
improvement. The public interest in encouraging invention supports an interpretation of the agreement excluding future improvements unless future improvements were specifically included.
Se« Appendix for Court Citations and Cross R«f«renc«s
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